Healthcare Organizations and 501(c)(3):  Uncertainty in the Post-Geisinger World by Dewees, Seth
Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-
Medicine
Volume 7 | Issue 2
1997
Healthcare Organizations and 501(c)(3):
Uncertainty in the Post-Geisinger World
Seth Dewees
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-Medicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation








THE MAJORITY OF HEALTHCARE services tradi-
tionally have been provided by nonprofit hospitals and largely
funded through the donations of philanthropic organizations.
By the mid-1970s, as a result of rising medical costs1 and
increased competition among providers, the traditional structure
of healthcare delivery began to erode.2 Today, the healthcare
industry is characterized by "the growth of the prospective
payment system, the increased consolidation of insurance and
service delivery within prepaid health plans, and the imposition
of a variety of regulatory measures."3
In particular, new institutions have taken the form of risk-
sharing Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Inte-
grated Delivery Systems (IDSs), which combine professional
and management services. While some of these entities are
contained within pre-existing hospital structures, state laws and
regulations often make it highly impractical, if not impossible,
to maintain HMOs within established healthcare organiza-
t J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 1996.
1. ORGANIUMrON FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERAON AND DEVELOPMENT, MEASURING
HEALTH CARE 1960-1983: EXPENDITURES, COSTS AND PERFORMANCE 29,53 (1985) (listing total
expenditures and pharmaceutical price indexes for healthcare between 1960 and 1983).
2. See Theodore R. Marmor et al., Nonprofit Organizations and Health Care, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 221 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).
3. Id. at 228.
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tions.4 Such laws have resulted in the establishment of HMOs
as separate corporate entities within larger healthcare systems.
With the development of freestanding HMOs, several
issues have arisen surrounding the exempt status of such orga-
nizations under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Traditionally, to be exempt from federal income taxation under
section 501(c)(3), an entity must be both "organized" and
"operated" for one of the purposes enumerated in that section.
To facilitate this inquiry, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
and courts have developed a "community benefit" test along
with a corollary "private benefit" test. Thus, in order to gain or
retain exemption, an organization must benefit a sufficiently
large portion of the population, while providing no significant
benefit to any private individual.
In addition to those organizations which themselves pro-
vide a community benefit, the IRS and the courts have extend-
ed exemption to other "related" entities. Under this test, tradi-
tionally known as the "integral part" test, an organization that
would otherwise fail the community benefit test could retain
exemption as long as that entity engages in activities which, if
carried on by its related organization, would not produce unre-
lated business income.' Thus, an organization could operate an
exempt subsidiary as long as the subsidiary significantly aided
the parent in furtherance of its exempt purposes.
Confusion has surrounded the application of both the
"community benefit" and "integral part" tests to newly devel-
oped care-providing organizations. Particularly troubling is the
tax treatment of Geisinger Health Plan (GHP), an HMO serv-
ing a large geographic area in northeastern Pennsylvania. In a
series of decisions, first by the IRS, then by the Tax Court, and
4. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1551-1568 (West 1997) (regulating HMOs through
the Commonwealth's Departments of Health and Insurance); 28 PA. CODE § 9.96 (1996)
(requiring at least one-third of an HMO's board of directors to consist of subscribers of the
HMO).
5. See Squire v. Students Book Corp., 191 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1951). The court
held that a campus book store and restaurant, operated as a separate corporate entity, was
nevertheless exempt, reasoning that "[t]he business enterprise in which taxpayer is engaged
obviously bears a close and intimate relationship to the functioning of the College itself." Id. See
also Rev. Rul. 58-194, 1958-1 C.B. 240 (approving the exemption of a book and supply store as
well as a restaurant at a state university since all are designed to benefit the students and faculty
and not any private shareholder or individual).
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ultimately by the Third Circuit,6 the Third Circuit held that
GHP neither passed the community benefit test nor the integral
part test.7 This litigation has left both scholars and practitio-
ners scratching their heads because the results are inconsistent
with both established case law applying the two tests and gen-
eral public policy rationales which underlie exemption for
healthcare providers.
Part II of this Note will discuss the application of the
community benefit test to HMOs and IDSs. Using Geisinger
Health Plan (GHP) as a paradigm, this part will examine the
realities that face healthcare systems that aspire to operate as
separately organized entities in light of the GHP decisions.
When viewed in conjunction with the Third Circuit's construc-
tion of the integral part test, that Court's construction of the
"community benefit" element suggests the following: an other-
wise exempt organization cannot operate a separately incorpo-
rated subsidiary within a larger healthcare network unless that
subsidiary duplicates services already provided by other entities
within the system. Common sense dictates that such an ineffi-
cient and illogical result be scrutinized closely.
Part III will examine both the Tax Court's [hereinafter
Geisinger II (Tax Ct.)] and the Third Circuit's [hereinafter
Geisinger II (3rd Cir.)] application of the integral part test in
Geisinger II. This part will conclude that the position taken by
the IRS, which was subsequently upheld by the Tax Court, is
internally inconsistent. The apparent implication of the Tax
Court's decision is that, in most cases a free-standing HMO,
organized by exempt entities within a healthcare network,
cannot be exempt, despite the fact that if the HMO operated
within one of the exempt entities, that organization would not
incur unrelated-business income taxation. The Third Circuit
upheld the Tax Court's result but applied a new test for which
no precedent can be found. Given its limited application, it is
unclear exactly how this test should be construed or whether it
will in fact be applied in the future. Regardless of which inte-
6. See Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1656 (1991), rev'd, 985
F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993); Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 394 (1993), aff d, 30
F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1994).
7. See Geisinger, 985 F.2d at 1210.
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gral part test is applied, the result in Geisinger II creates a
distinction based entirely on form, and not one in substance.
Finally, Part IV of this Note will look briefly at the public
policy considerations surrounding exemptions for healthcare
organizations. This part will ultimately conclude that the IRS
and the courts strayed from these policy considerations with
the GHP decisions. In an area of law that is already plagued by
a lack of clarity, the Geisinger decisions have created a morass
of uncertainty which indeed may take years to wade through.
H. APPLICATION OF THE COMMUNITY
BENEFIT TEST TO HMOs AND IDSs
A. Charitable Requirements of Section 501(c)(3)
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides
exemption from federal income taxation to "[c]orporations, and
any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and oper-
ated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes."' Because the
providing of medical care is not one of the purposes specif-
ically enumerated in the Code, the rendering of medical servic-
es must fall under the broad umbrella of "charitable purpos-
es."9 Federal Regulations make it clear that "charity," as used
in section 501(c)(3), is to be construed "in its generally accept-
ed legal sense and is... not to be construed as limited by the
separate enumeration in section 501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt
purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of 'charity'
as developed by judicial decisions."' For guidance in deter-
mining what is charitable "in its generally accepted legal
sense," the courts primarily have looked to charitable trust law."
Throughout the 1800s, hospitals rendered the majority of
their services to indigent patients who were unable to pay for
care. 2 These hospitals almost completely relied on the philan-
8. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
9. See id.
10. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1997) (defining "charitable" and providing examples
of organizations which qualify as "charitable" under 501(c)(3) of the Code).
11. See, e.g., Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 177-78 (1978) (citing
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971) and Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971)).
12. Marmor, supra note 2, at 224 (providing an historical overview of the structure of
354 [Vol. 7:351
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thropic donations of religious organizations to support their
operations.'" As such, the traditional functions of hospitals
were characterized as "charitable" in the strictest sense of the
word. 4
During the first half of the twentieth century, extraordinary
advances in the field of medicine "transformed hospitals from
the dumping ground of humanity to the pinnacle establishment
of the healthcare delivery system."'" For example, in the post
World War II era, due to the development of governmental
subsidies such as Social Security, Medicaid, and Medicare,
hospitals became increasingly less reliant on donative sup-
port. 6 The IRS was cognizant of the rapidly changing envi-
ronment of the delivery of medical care, and accordingly,
maintained a flexible definition of charity when determining
exemption status under section 501(c)(3). In 1956, the IRS
issued a Revenue Ruling which defined the required level of
free or low-cost care necessary to qualify for exemption as a
charity under section 501(c)(3). 7 Although no specific level
was delineated, the Ruling made it clear that if an organization
had the financial resources to provide free services, it was
required to do so.'"
In 1969, the IRS issued another Revenue Ruling in re-
sponse to requests for advice concerning the required level of
free care. 9 In that Ruling, the IRS once again recognized
changing conditions and backed off its 1956 position. Revenue
healthcare delivery in the United States).
13. Id.
14. See Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals:
Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WAsH. L. REv. 307,318 (1991) (describing the
voluntary hospitals of the nineteenth century as "organized by religious societies, heavily funded
by donations, and staffed by doctors who worked without compensation and nurses who worked
for room and board as part of their lifetime commitment to a religious order devoted to caring for
the poor").
15. Id.at319.
16. See Marinor, supra note 2, at 226 (describing the growth of public medical facilities
and the reduced need for donative financing in the 1960s and 1970s).
17. See Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 (providing in part that for an organization to be
exempt "[i]t must be operated to the extent of its financial ability for those not able to pay for the
services rendered and not exclusively for those who are able and expected to pay").
18. See id.
19. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. In this ruling, the IRS used two hypothetical
hospitals as examples to illustrate the changing requirements necessary to retain exemption. In
light of the examples used, it seems clear that hospitals could serve sufficiently charitable purpos-
es while providing little or no free care.
19971
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Ruling 56-185 was expressly modified "to remove therefrom
the requirements relating to caring for patients without charge
or at rates below cost." In 1973, with Revenue Ruling 73-
313, the IRS granted exemption to an organization which built
medical facilities in an attempt to induce physicians to practice
medicine in a particular area.2" The IRS reasoned that the
complete lack of medical services within the community posed
a substantial risk to public health and safety, such that
"[p]roviding the physical facility in the manner described bears
a clear relationship to lessening of the health hazards resulting
from the absence of a local practitioner in the community."'
In addition to the positions espoused by the IRS, courts
have followed suit in maintaining a flexible definition of "char-
itable purpose." In Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion v. Simon, the Court examined the validity of Revenue
Ruling 69-545 in light of the language of section 501(c)(3).'
In upholding the validity of the Ruling, the Court heavily re-
lied on changes in the healthcare field. The Court noted that
"[t]o continue to base the 'charitable' status of a hospital strict-
ly on the relief it provides for the poor fails to account for
these major changes in the area of healthcare."'24
The first case to rule on the exempt status of an HMO was
Sound Health Association v. Commissioner.' There, the Tax
Court again emphasized the flexible construction of "charity"
as contemplated by section 501(c)(3).' Thus, despite the
20. Id.
21. See Rev. Rul. 73-313, 1973-2 C.B. 174. "An organization formed and supported by
residents of an isolated rural community to provide a medical building and facilities at reasonable
rent to attract a doctor who would provide medical services to the entire community is exempt
under section 501(c)(3) of the Code." Id.
22. Id.
23. 506 F.2d 1278, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
24. Id. at 1288-89. Two major factors underlying the court's holding were the increase in
public healthcare and the rise of Medicaid and Medicare along with an increase in coverage by
medical and hospital insurance. Such changes led to a decrease in the number of indigents
requiring free or below-cost medical care.
25. 71 T.C. 158 (1978).
26. Id. at 178. In supporting a broad definition of "charitable purpose," the court stated
that:
[W]hile it is true that in the past Congress and the federal courts have conditioned the
hospital's charitable status on the level of free or below cost care that it provided for
indigents, there is no authority for the conclusion that the determination of 'charitable'
status was always to be so limited. Such an inflexible construction fails to recognize
the changing economic, social and technological precepts and values of contemporary
356 [Vol. 7:351
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changing environment of healthcare delivery, the IRS and
courts alike consistently adapted to meet the changes.
B. Pre-Geisinger Interpretations of HMOs' Fulfillment
of the Community Benefit Element
As the nature of healthcare delivery continued to evolve in
the second half of the twentieth century, one of the dominant
structures to emerge was the HMO. In particular, as the costs
of healthcare drastically increased in the 1970s and 1980s,
membership in HMOs rose exponentially.' The National
Health Lawyers Association defines an HMO as "a legal entity
that combines the insurance of healthcare with the delivery of
healthcare. Specifically, HMOs provide or arrange for the
provision of comprehensive healthcare services for a fixed, pre-
paid charge."
Under section 501(c)(3), an exempt organization must be
"organized" for one of the enumerated exempt purposes. Feder-
al Regulations set out the standard for passing the "organiza-
tional test."29 Because healthcare delivery has been widely
viewed as having an underlying charitable purpose, HMOs can
be "organized" for a charitable purpose if they follow the orga-
society.
Id.
27. See NATIONAL HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N, INTRODUCTION TO ALTERNATIVE DEuVERY
MECHANISMS: HMOs, PPO's & CMPs 5, 5 (Jeanie M. Johnson ed., 1986) (stating that the
number of HMOs increased from approximately thirty in 1970 with a total membership of
approximately three million, to four hundred in 1986 with a membership of twenty million).
28. lId Under this definition, four characteristics are essential to the structure of HMOs:
1. an organized system of healthcare in a geographic area, generally including the
services of physicians whom the HMO employs or contracts with and hospitals which
the HMO owns or contracts with; 2. a set of comprehensive basic health benefits,
specified by state and/or federal law and regulations; 3. a voluntarily enrolled group of
persons; and 4. a predetermined and fixed periodic payment made by or on behalf of
each person or family unit enrolled in the HMO without regard to the amount of actual
services provided.
l
29. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(1)(ii) (1997). The organizational test provides the
following:
[An organization is organized exclusively for one or more exempt purposes only if its
articles of organization ... (a) Limit the purposes of such organization to one or more
exempt purposes; and (b) Do not expressly empower the organization to engage,
otherwise than as an insubstantial part of its activities, in activities which in
themselves are not in the furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.
Id § 1.501(c)(3) - l(b)(1)(i).
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nizational procedures set forth in the Regulations. Generally, in
organizing HMOs, this has not been a highly litigated issue.
Rather, the primary issues surrounding the exemption of
healthcare providers, and specifically HMOs, involve the "op-
erational test." Federal Regulations provide a general definition
of organizations which are "operated" in furtherance of an
exempt purpose.' To pass the operational test, no more than
an insubstantial part of an organization's activities may be
directed to a purpose other than an exempt purpose enumerated
in section 501(c)(3).
As previously discussed in Section II, subsection A, the
applicable standard for determining whether a hospital is "op-
erating" in furtherance of an exempt charitable purpose in-
volves some measure of free or low-cost care. Likewise, to aid
in applying the operational test, the "community benefit" stan-
dard was adopted." This new approach resulted from a recog-
nition that healthcare organizations, while unable to feasibly
provide free or low-cost care, were able, nonetheless, to pro-
vide significant benefits to society as a whole. Under this stan-
dard, the courts began looking at a variety of characteristics in
addition to free care when determining the tax status of
healthcare organizations.32
An initial issue with respect to determining whether
HMOs would qualify for the section 501(c)(3) exemption was
how the community benefit test would be construed. In Sound
Health Association, the Court held that the appropriate standard
involved the same considerations encompassed in evaluating
hospitals.33 Likewise, under Revenue Ruling 69-545, neither
30. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c) (1997) The operational test provides the following:
[Ain organization will be regarded as 'operated exclusively' for one or more exempt
purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of
such exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3). An organization will not be so
regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an
exempt purpose.
Id.
31. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (providing in part that the relevant inquiry with
respect to a hospital's exemption is whether the organization provides services which are "deemed
beneficial to the community as a whole...").
32. See Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 184 (1978). Among the factors
considered by the court were the open subscribership of the HMO, its operation of an emergency
room, its operation of an ambulance company, and a research program designed to help
physicians to study ways of improving the delivery of services. Id.
33. Id. at 178-79 (asserting that because providing medical services is a charitable activity,
[Vol. 7:351
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hospitals nor HMOs are required to provide free care in order
to pass the community benefit test. Finally, in 1983, the IRS
issued a Revenue Ruling which relaxed the previous require-
ment that hospitals operate a public emergency room without
consideration of the patients' ability to pay for emergency
services.3' Thus, both the IRS and the courts seemed to apply
the community benefit test to HMOs as if they were hospitals.
C. Community Benefit and Geisinger Health Plan:
A Change in Exempt Status for HMOs
GHP was an HMO, incorporated under the laws of Penn-
sylvania, which served an open subscribership. GHP was part
of a large healthcare network which consisted of a number of
related organizations, all under the Geisinger Foundation's
control .35 The system as a whole served twenty-seven counties
and a total of 2.1 million people.36 Geisinger Foundation itself
was an exempt organization. Likewise, many of the other
members of the Geisinger Network were also exempt.3 1
Among the other organizations comprising the Geisinger Sys-
tem were the following: "Geisinger Medical Center, a 569-bed
tertiary care regional medical center and teaching hospital;
Geisinger Wyoming Valley Medical Center, a 230-bed com-
munity hospital; and Geisinger Clinic, a group practice em-
ploying more than 400 licensed physicians and conducting an
extensive medical research program. '38 GHP provided no medi-
cal services itself, but contracted with other members of the
Geisinger System to provide services to its subscribers.
"it is reasonable to conclude that the tests applied to determine the status of a hospital are relevant
to a determination of the status of an HMO").
34. See Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94 (providing that hospitals are no longer required
to operate emergency rooms open to the public without regard to ability to pay if so doing would
needlessly duplicate already existing services).
35. See Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1656, 1656 (describing
purpose and structure of the Geisinger Health Plan).
36. Id.
37. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,830 (Aug. 30, 1990). Geisinger Foundation also operated
three for-profit organizations which were not a part of the medical-care network. See Geisinger,
62 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1656.
38. Frederick J. Gerhart & Melissa B. Rasman, HMO Denied Section 501(c)(3) Status by
Third Circuit, 4J. TAx ExEMPr ORG. 17 (1993). GHP contracted primarily with these entities to
deliver services to its subscribers. Id.
1997]
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The IRS initially denied tax exemption to GHP for a num-
ber of reasons. First, in 1990, in a General Counsel Memoran-
dum, the Assistant Commissioner identified the characteristics
of Sound Health which led to its exempt status.39 In compar-
ing GHP with the Sound Health facility, GCM 39828 identified
several differences between the two which it believed justified
the denial of exemption. For example, one important factor, as
expressed in the General Counsel Memorandum, was the nature
of GHP's membership. "Sound Health and [the Assistant Com-
missioner] require.., that the membership be truly open, that
is, that there be no meaningful restrictions on membership
which would preclude a finding that the entity serves the com-
munity as a whole."'  Though the Assistant Commissioner
enumerated this as an essential criterion for exempt status, the
General Counsel Memorandum offered little evidence which
supported the conclusion that there were substantial barriers to
membership in GHP, such that it provided no substantial bene-
fit to the community.41
Second, and perhaps the most important rationale underly-
ing the IRS's refusal to grant GHP exemption was the nature
of risk-sharing exercised under GHP. The Assistant Commis-
sioner stated that if a plan "is found to be providing 'commer-
cial-type' insurance in more than an insubstantial amount, it
will be precluded from 501(c)(3) status."'42 Following a
lengthy discussion of case law concerning the definition of
"commercial insurance," the IRS concluded that non-staffed
HMOs, like GHP, were predominantly in the business of pro-
39. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828 (Aug. 30, 1990). Among the factors emphasized were
actual provision of services and maintenance of medical facilities and employees, availability of
emergency services, and provision of services to nonmembers on a fee-for- service basis. Id.
40. Id. The factors relevant in determining whether a membership is sufficiently open so
as to provide a substantial benefit to the community as a whole are:
[A] membership composed of both groups and individuals where such individuals
compose a substantial portion of the membership; an overt program to attract
individuals to become members; a community rating system that provides uniform
rates for prepaid care; similar rates charged to individuals and groups (with a possible
modest initiation fee for individuals); and no substantive age or health barriers to
eligibility for either individuals or groups.
Id.
41. See id. The reasons offered by the IRS for denying exemption on restrictive
membership grounds was the insubstantial number of individuals enrolled in the program, and no




viding insurance. The IRS reasoned that because GHP neither
provided direct services nor employed any physicians, it func-
tioned essentially in the same manner as an insurance compa-
ny. Because the risk was shifted from subscribers to the plan
and not to actual care providers, the IRS characterized GHP's
activities as "providing 'commercial type' insurance."'43
Though the insurance argument was a determinative factor for
denying exempt status, for reasons apparently unarticulated, the
IRS later abandoned this argument in the litigation which fol-
lowed.
After receiving a final negative ruling from the IRS, GHP
filed suit against the Commissioner in the Tax Court.' 4 Initial-
ly, the Court looked at GHP's Articles of Incorporation and
determined that the Plan was brganized for the purpose of
providing healthcare to patients in the geographic area served
by the Plan.45 Next, the Court examined the operations of
GHP to determine whether or not the Plan provided a substan-
tial benefit to the community. The Court reversed its earlier
finding and held that GHP's membership was essentially open
to all groups and individuals within the geographic area served
by the Plan.' In addition, the Court noted that "individual
members and group members were required to pay the same
amount to petitioner for the healthcare services that they re-
ceived, which amount was determined on a community rating
system by balancing high-risk members against low-risk mem-
bers."'47 The Court also emphasized the fact that GIP had
adopted a subsidized dues program designed to secure
healthcare for those unable to afford membership payments.
In its analysis, the Tax Court relied on the aforementioned
factors when it applied the Sound Health standard to GHP. In
43. Id.
44. See Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1656 (1991).
45. Id. at 1657-58 (noting that GHP's articles of incorporation restricted its activities to
those serving its exempt purposes).
46. 1& at 1659. The Court noted that in its first nine months of operation, GHP enrolled all
but six percent of its individual applicants. Less than one year following the commencement of
operations, GHP had enrolled 2,380 individual members, and this number eventually increased to
4,396. Id.
47. Id. Individual members were required to pay an additional premium not required of




construing Sound Health the court held that "[i]t was that
HMO's particular form of membership organization that most
qualified it as an organization providing benefit to the commu-
nity."' Contrary to the position taken by the IRS, the Tax
Court did not find the differences between GHP and Sound
Health dispositive in determining GHP's tax status. Rather,
heavily relying on GHP's open-membership and subsidized
dues program, the Court ultimately held that GHP was entitled
to exemption.49
The IRS appealed the Tax Court's decision to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Applying the standards
set forth in Sound Health, the Court reversed the Tax Court
and remanded the case for further proceedings. 0 While not
expressly overruling Sound Health, the Third Circuit did hold
that the Court "ventured too far" in that case." According to
the Third Circuit, the Sound Health Court accorded dispropor-
tionate weight to the subsidized dues program. While the Court
did recognize that "no clear test has emerged to apply to non-
profit hospitals seeking tax exemptions,"52 it chose not to fol-
low the Tax Court's analysis. Instead, it faulted that court for
relying too heavily upon a relatively open membership to sup-
port its proposition that the HMO provided a benefit to the
community as a whole, as opposed to just benefitting its sub-
scribers.53
The Third Circuit agreed with the IRS that the factors
crucial to the exemption of Sound Health were not present in
GHP. In particular, the Court focused on the actual provision
of healthcare services, and thus distinguished GHP from Sound
Health on the grounds that Sound Health owned its own facili-
ties and employed its own physicians.54 However, if GHP had
48. Id. at 1662.
49. Id. at 1664.
50. See Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that
Geisinger Health Plan, standing alone, is not entitled to tax exempt status under 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(3)).
51. Id. at 1219 (holding that the Sound Health court applied too loose a standard in
determining whether that HMO provided a significant community benefit).
52. Id. at 1217.
53. Id. at 1216.
54. See id. at 1217-18 (stressing the fact that the employees of Sound Health provided




performed services paralleling those rendered by Sound Health,
it would have been needlessly duplicating services already
provided by other entities within the Geisinger System. Ulti-
mately, the Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court and decided
that GHP was not entitled to exemption under the community
benefit standard. The case was remanded to the Tax Court to
determine whether GHP could qualify for exemption under the
"integral part" doctrine.
D. Community Benefit After Geisinger I
In the wake of Geisinger I (both the Tax Court and the
Third Circuit decisions), it is difficult to ascertain what factors
will be accorded the most weight when applying the communi-
ty benefit test to HMOs. The construction of community bene-
fit articulated in Sound Health is more logical in both its for-
mulation and application than the Third Circuit's construction.
While the Sound Health Court exhibited some confusion in
sorting out the private and community benefit tests, it did
recognize the close relationship between open membership and
community benefit. If subscribership is open to essentially any
member of the community, with no barriers other than finan-
cial ones, the benefit which accrues to the membership in
effect accrues to the community as well.
While the Sound Health Court did recognize the existence
of a nominal dues program for those unable to afford member-
ship, the case does not appear to have been decided on that
basis.55 Rather, it appears that Sound Health was decided pri-
marily on the basis of open membership. Thus, the standards
articulated in that case may present some difficulties in provid-
ing guidance for construing community benefit. As discussed
below, the Sound Health standard may need to be modified to
yield a construction of the community benefit test that takes
into consideration the appropriate factors.
Given the Third Circuit's position in Geisinger I, consider-
able doubt remains concerning the application of the communi-
55. See Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 187 (1978) (finding that
various services including the subsidized dues program go beyond mere emergency room services
that characterize a charitable hospital).
1997]
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ty benefit test to HMOs. Clearly the Third Circuit rejected the
Sound Health approach with respect to membership. Although
the Third Circuit was unwilling to accept the construction of
the Tax Court, it offered little in the way of a definitive test
for determining whether an HMO provides a sufficient commu-
nity benefit.
A common point of both Geisinger I decisions was that
both the 3rd Circuit and IRS seem to have emphasized the
provision of services by the organization itself as essential for
acquiring exempt status. However, the relative importance of
this element has been called into question by two subsequent
IRS Revenue Rulings.56 First, in 1993, the IRS granted
Friendly Hills Health Care Network exempt status. The IRS de-
scribed Friendly Hills Health Care operations as follows:
You will provide all assets, personal property, management
services, and non-physician support personnel. You will con-
tract with the former Medical Group, which has reorganized
into a new Medical Group that no longer owns any of the assets
used by the integrated health delivery system, to provide all
professional medical services for your enrollees.'
In granting the network exemption under section 501(c)(3), the
IRS relied heavily on the facts that the network owned some
medical facilities, continued to operate an emergency room,
and conducted some medical research."
Next, the IRS granted the Facey Medical Foundation ex-
empt status even though the foundation itself only would pro-
vide "management services and non-physician support." 9 In
granting exemption to this foundation, the IRS emphasized the
contractual arrangements between the foundation and care
providers which required rendering of free services.' In addi-
tion, the IRS focused on the Foundation's conducting
56. See Friendly Hills Health Care Network Qualifies for (c)(3) Exemption, 93 TNT 40-
113 (Feb. 19, 1993); Facey Med. Found. Qualifies for (c)(3) Exemption, 93 TNT 83-116 (Mar.
31, 1993).
57. 93 TNT 40-113.
58. Id.
59. See Facey Med. Found. Qualifies for (c)(3) Exemption, 93 TNT 83-116 (Mar. 31,





"significant programs of clinical research and public health
education programs.""
In light of the Friendly Hills and Facey exemption Rul-
ings, the direct provision of services is not in and of itself a
dispositive factor. While the community benefit standard has
always been a flexible one, these Rulings demonstrate that
flexibility has given way to complete uncertainty. Hopefully,
future case law and Revenue Rulings will clarify the standard.
Presently, as there is little guidance as to the relative
weight accorded to each of the determinative factors, it would
be wise for the IRS to alleviate the present confusion with
some definitive guidance. While undoubtedly the test must be
applied on a case-by-case basis, organizations need this guid-
ance to ensure compliance with the community benefit stan-
dard.
I. APPLICATION OF THE INTEGRAL
PART DOCTRINE62
A. Definition
The integral part doctrine is not itself contained in the
United States Tax Code. Nevertheless, both the IRS and the
courts have recognized that the doctrine:
[P]rovides a means by which organizations may qualify for
exemption vicariously through related organizations, as long as
they are engaged in activities which would be exempt if the re-
lated organizations engaged in them, and as long as those activ-
ities are furthering the exempt purposes of the related organiza-
tions.63
Federal regulations, applicable to feeder organizations, enumer-
ate the requirements for a subsidiary to maintain exemption un-
der the integral part doctrine.' Likewise, this construction has
61. Id.
62. The integral part doctrine permits an organization, that would otherwise fail the
community benefit test, to retain exemption as long as that entity engages in activities which, if
carried on by its related organization, would not produce unrelated-business income. See infra
footnotes 63-65 and accompanying text for a comprehensive definition of this doctrine.
63. See Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1210, 1220 (3rd Cir. 1993)
(citing Texas Learning Tech. Group v. Commissioner, 958 F.2d 122, 126 (5th Cir. 1992)).
64. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.502-1(b) (1996). This section provides in part that "a subsidiary
organization is not exempt from tax if it is operated for the primary purpose of carrying on a trade
1997]
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been widely adopted by the courts when applying the integral
part test.65
B. Integral Part Test: The Tax Court's
Treatment in Geisinger 11
Having determined that GHP was not entitled to exemp-
tion under the community benefit standard, the Third Circuit
remanded the case to the Tax Court for a determination of
whether GHP was entitled to exemption as an integral part of
the Geisinger System.' Following an initial discussion of the
functional structure of GHP within the Geisinger System, the
Tax Court held that GHP was not entitled to exemption be-
cause it did not provide an "essential service" to any of its
related organizations. 7 Relying on Squire v. Students Book
Corporation,' Brundage v. Commissioner,69  and B.H.W.
Anesthesia Foundation, Incorporated v. Commissioner,70 the
Tax Court concluded that in order for the integral part doctrine
to be applied successfully to GHP, "the population of subscrib-
ers would have to overlap substantially with the patients of the
related exempt entities."' To make this determination, the
or business which would be an unrelated trade or business (that is, unrelated to exempt activities)
if regularly carried on by the parent organization." Id. This regulation also provides examples to
illustrate the operation of the integral part doctrine. An organization operated for the sole purpose
of providing electric power to its exempt parent would be exempt under the doctrine. Id. However,
if the subsidiary, although related to the exempt parent, had as its primary purpose the provision
of electric power to organizations other than the parent, it would not qualify for exemption. Id.
65. See Squire v. Student Book Corp., 191 F.2d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir. 1951) (affirming a
trial court's decision that a campus book store should be treated as a tax exempt entity since it
bore a close and intimate relationship to the functioning of a tax exempt university); Brundage v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1468, 1474 (1970) (applying the integral part test to hold an art museum
exempt as part of a city school system); B.H.W. Anesthesia Found., Inc. v. Commissioner, 72
T.C. 681, 685-87 (1979) (holding a non-profit corporation, within a teaching hospital's de-
partment of anesthesiology, exempt under the integral part doctrine).
66. See Geisinger, 985 F.2d at 1220.
67. See Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 394,400 (1993) (discussing the
final adverse ruling by the IRS against GHP on the integral part issue). The court reasoned:
[Iun order to qualify for exemption under the integral part theory, petitioner must
perform an essential service either to its affiliates or to the class of direct beneficiaries
of the charitable activities of its affiliates (in petitioner's case, its patients), as required
by the entities in the legal precedents in this area.
Id. (citations omitted).
68. 191F.2dat118.
69. 54 T.C. at 1474.
70. 72 T.C. at 687.
71. Geisinger, 100T.C. at404.
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Tax Court primarily focused on the prior finding of the Third
Circuit that GHP's sole purpose was to serve the interests of its
subscribers, the court found little, if any, overlap of beneficia-
ries among GHP and its related organizations.72
While the basis upon which the Tax Court ultimately
denied exemption is unclear, the Court did acknowledge the
traditional approach to applying the integral part test. Both the
IRS and GHP referred to the "question of whether petitioner's
activities would constitute an unrelated business if conducted
by petitioner's affiliate"73 as dispositive of the issue of GHP's
exemption. Analogizing to cases in which laboratory or phar-
macy services were provided to those other than patients of the
related entities, the IRS argued that because the subscribers of
GHP were not patients of any of the related entities, the activi-
ties of GHP would be unrelated if conducted by any of the
other members of the Geisinger system.74 In response, GHP
pointed out that if one of the other members of the Geisinger
system carried on the activities of GHP, it would in fact be
more charitable than the HMO which was granted exemption
in Sound Health."
The Court did not specifically address the merits of either
of these arguments, but rather inquired into the number of ser-
vices rendered to GHP subscribers outside of the Geisinger
System. 6 Concluding that the record could not justify a find-
ing either way with respect to the number of services provided
to GIP subscribers by unrelated organizations, the Court held
that the commissioner did not err in determining that GHP was
not entitled to exemption.'
Finally, the Court distinguished this case from those where
the issue was whether certain business activities would give
rise to unrelated-business income taxation.78 In cases where
the amount of taxable income was at issue, courts have rou-




75. See generally Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner 71 T.C. 158 (1978).
76. Geisinger, 100 T.C. at 405.




portion of the net income is subject to unrelated-business in-
come taxation.79 Income generated from transactions with un-
related entities are subject to the tax, while income resulting
from the provision of services to the parent organization are
not taxed. However, the Geisinger II Court held that in cases
where exemption is the primary issue, no accounting can be
done to separate services provided to the exempt parent and
services provided to unrelated entities. 0 This is a curious po-
sition, especially in light of the Court's analysis which in effect
attempted to make such an allocation. As will be discussed
below, the Tax Court's decision is riddled with confusion and
inconsistency.
The most glaring of the problems raised by the Tax
Court's decision in Geisinger II stems from the Court's failure
to recognize the inextricably intertwined purposes of GHP and
its related affiliates. For example, the Court relies on prior
cases and Revenue Rulings which involve the rendering of
laboratory and pharmacy services. In fact, the Court should
have distinguished these cases from Geisinger II for the fol-
lowing reason: in those cases, if the parent organization carried
on the activities of the subsidiary, it would have been simple to
distinguish between services rendered to the beneficiaries of
the parent and those rendered to unrelated entities. The alloca-
tion could have been made because the purpose of providing
pharmacy or laboratory services is distinguishable from the
direct provision of medical services to patients. In contrast,
with GHP, both the purpose of GHP and the other related enti-
ties within the system, was to provide medical services. Be-
cause the GHP provided medical services to its subscribers by
contracting with other entities in the Geisinger System, the
subscribers of GHP were indistinguishable from the other pa-
tients of that entity if the same activities were carried on by
one of the other exempt organizations in the system.
In spite of the IRS's position, it is difficult to imagine that
if, in fact, the activities of GHP were conducted by one of the
other entities in the System, such activities would give rise to
79. Id.
80. Id. at 406-07.
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unrelated-business income taxation for that organization."s
GHP presented a compelling argument that if any of the other
exempt organizations in the System were carrying on the activ-
ities of GHP, that entity would look more charitable than the
HMO in Sound Health. Part of Sound Health's operations
consisted of an HMO very similar to GHP. 2 While in that
case Sound Health's exemption was ultimately granted on
community benefit grounds and not via the integral part doc-
trine, there is no evidence which suggests that the IIMO por-
tion of Sound Health's operations was subject to unrelated-
business income taxation. In fact, the operation of a risk-shar-
ing entity was a substantial part of Sound Health's business.
Contrary to the position taken by the IRS and the Tax Court in
Geisinger II, it seems quite unlikely that the operations of
GHP, carried on by any of the exempt organizations in the
Geisinger System, would give rise to unrelated-business in-
come taxation.
Was the Tax Court suggesting, by examining the record
for evidence of services provided to GHP subscribers by non-
Geisinger entities, that if the record had shown no substantial
amount of services provided by unrelated entities, GHP would
have been entitled to exemption? This approach seems entirely
inconsistent with the Court's analysis of GHP's limited class of
beneficiaries. If, in fact, there were no overlap between the
subscribers of GHP and the patients of the other entities within
the system, then under the Court's initial analysis, GHP would
fall the integral part test even if one hundred percent of the
services to GHP subscribers were provided by other Geisinger
organizations.
A final and significant difficulty raised by the Tax Court's
decision involves the failure to allocate income. The Court held
that because the issue was exemption rather than the amount of
taxable income, allocation among different types of income
was inappropriate. This approach leads to discrepancies in tax
treatment based entirely on form as opposed to substance.
Under the Tax Court's analysis in Geisinger II, an organization
81. Id. at 404.
82. See Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 167-68 (1978) (describing the
IRS's initial denial of exemption due to the limited class of beneficiaries).
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loses its exemption when any part of its operations would be
unrelated if carried on by its exempt affiliates. In contrast, a
system which performs the same functions within one of the
exempt entities of the system retains its exemption. Related
entities are penalized solely for operating the organization as a
separate entity. It seems that some assessment regarding the
number of services provided to the related organizations is nec-
essary to determine an organization's exemption status.
If some small part of an organization's activities would
constitute an unrelated trade or business in the hands of its re-
lated exempt affiliates, what would be the result? Under the
Tax Court's approach, presumably that organization would not
be entitled to exemption. If this were the case, the taxable
organization would be required to pay income tax on all of its
earnings, including that portion associated with services ren-
dered to its related exempt organizations. Were the parent
organization to operate the subsidiary within an exempt organi-
zation, it would be required to pay unrelated-business income
taxation only on that portion of income derived from non-ex-
empt activities.
The result described above favors conducting activities,
any part of which might give rise to unrelated-business income
taxation, within preexisting exempt organizations. As previous-
ly discussed, there are a number of valid reasons why operat-
ing such organizations as separate entities might be advanta-
geous or necessary. Furthermore, neither legal precedent nor
public policies underlying tax treatment of exempt organiza-
tions justify such a distinction.
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C. Geisinger II Appealed to the Third Circuit:
Adding to the Confusion
After the Tax Court denied exemption under the integral
part doctrine, GHP again appealed to the Third Circuit." In
Geisinger I (3rd Cir.), the Court had denied exemption under
the community benefit standard and remanded the case to the
Tax Court for a determination regarding the integral part doc-
trine.84 In so doing, the Third Circuit described the integral
part test as follows:
The integral part doctrine provides a means by which organiza-
tions may qualify for exemption vicariously through related
organizations, as long as they are engaged in activities which
would be exempt if the related organizations engaged in them,
and as long as those activities are furthering the exempt pur-
poses of the related organizations."
Despite the Third Circuit's own interpretation of the inte-
gral part test in Geisinger I, when the case was appealed to the
Third Circuit [Geisinger II (3rd Cir.)], the Court asserted that it
was in no way bound by any previous construction of the
integral part doctrine, including its own in Geisinger L86 The
Court departed from the traditional construction of the doctrine
and concluded that "we will determine whether GHP is exempt
from taxation when examined in the context of its relationship
with the other entities in the System, but also based upon its
own organizational structure."87 Thus, the Court fashioned a
new, two-pronged integral part test known as the "boost test."
Under this new test,
[A] subsidiary which is not entitled to exempt status on its own
may only receive such status as an integral part of its
§ 501(c)(3) qualified parent [footnote omitted] if (i) it is not
carrying on a trade or business which would be an unrelated
trade or business (that is, unrelated to exempt activities) if regu-
83. Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 30 F.3d 494 (3rd Cir. 1994) [hereinafter
Geisinger 11 (3rd Cir.)].
84. See Geisinger, 985 F.2d at 1221.
85. Id. at 1220.
86. See Geisinger, 30 F.3d at 499 (holding that although the traditional analysis was
relevant, the unrelated-business test was necessary, but not sufficient, for resolving




larly carried on by the parent, and (ii) its relationship to its
parent somehow enhances the subsidiary's own exempt charac-
ter to the point that, when the boost provided by the parent is
added to the contribution made by the subsidiary itself, the
subsidiary would be entitled to § 501(c)(3) status."8
To illustrate the workings of the so-called "boost" test, the
Court used the classic example of a power company producing
electricity solely supplied to an exempt educational organiza-
tion. 9 The Court reasoned that although the power company
could not be exempt on its own, because the provision of elec-
tric power is not a charitable activity, its purpose is transposed
into a charitable one by virtue of its relationship with the ex-
empt parent. In effect, the power company receives a "boost"
from its exempt parent." In applying this new analysis to the
Geisinger System, the Court found that GHP could not meet
the requirements of the test's second prong.
Here, we do not think that GHP receives any 'boost' from its
association with the Geisinger System... the manner in which
GHP interacts with other entities in the System makes clear, its
association with those entities does nothing to increase the
portion of the community for which GHP promotes health- it
serves no more people as a part of the System than it would
serve otherwise.9'
Essentially, the Court determined that although the operation of
GHP did allow the System as a whole to reach a wider cross
section of the community, the subscribers of GHP would com-
prise the same fraction of the community whether GHP was
associated with the System or contracted through entirely unre-
lated entities. Finally, it bears notice that, having determined
that GHP could not meet the boost requirement, the Court
declined to address the unrelated-business issue. It did, howev-
er, hint that if another of the exempt organizations within the
System undertook the activities of GHP it might not incur
unrelated-business income taxation.92
88. Id. at 501.
89. Id. at 501-02.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 502.
92. Id. at 501. The court stated the following:
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As with the Tax Court decision, many uncertainties arise
in interpreting the Third Circuit decision in Geisinger II. The
traditional test applied by the courts is found in the federal
regulations pertaining to feeder organizations.93 In fact, at the
Tax Court level, both the IRS and GHP stipulated that the
relevant issue was whether the activities of GHP, if carried on
by another exempt entity within the Geisinger System, would
constitute an unrelated trade or business.94 However, in the
face of federal regulations and generally established case law,
the Third Circuit saw fit to fashion its own test.
Given its limited application, it is unclear exactly what the
second prong of the "boost" test entails. This "boost" test finds
no basis in precedent and makes little if any sense as applied
in Geisinger Ii." Additionally, it is unclear what results this
test would yield in many of the established cases which em-
body the integral part doctrine. There is considerable doubt as
to whether many of the organizations previously granted ex-
emption under the integral part test would retain exemption
under the new standard."
Whether income received by an HMO operated by an entity which also directly oper-
ates a healthcare facility would be deemed unrelated business income was answered in
the negative by Sound Health. Nevertheless, this is a complex issue which will
probably be further explored by the courts and Congress as the entities which pay for
healthcare, and those which provide it, begin to intertwine.
Id.
93. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.502-1(b) (1996) (describing the traditional integral part doctrine).
94. See Geisinger, 100 T.C. at 404 (including a discussion of revenue rulings and
exemptions).
95. See Bruce R. Hopkins, Integral Part Doctrine Held to Embody "Boost" Requirement,
10 EXEM' ORG. TAX REV. 784, 785 (1994). The author described the holding of the Third
Circuit in the following terms:
Now we have this foolishness in the form of the 'boost' principle- something hereto-
fore not known as part of the law encompassing the integral part doctrine. Someone
just 'invented' this one. There is no precedent whatsoever for this pronouncement-
and no need for it either.
This newly discovered 'boost' rule requires that the 'parent' provide a 'boost' to the
'subsidiary.' However, up to this point, if there was any 'boost' occurring, it was the
other way around. That the court is amiss in articulating a 'boost' requirement and then
getting it backward is evident in the example given in the very regulations it cited as
the genesis of the integral part doctrine.
Id.




IMPLICATIONS FOR TIE FUTURE
A. Impact of the Third Circuit Decisions
The initial significant blunder made by the Third Circuit
was abandoning the principles which provided the foundation
for the Sound Health decision.' In that case, the Court had
the insight to recognize that a subscribership which is open to
essentially any member of the community indeed provides a
substantial community benefit. Combined with the fact that
GHP had in place a program to subsidize membership among
indigent members of the community, GHP's open
subscribership was sufficient to constitute a substantial commu-
nity benefit. The conscious effort by GHP to reduce or elimi-
nate financial barriers to membership is evidence that GHP
intended to provide medical services to as much of the commu-
nity as possible. This approach to community benefit makes far
more sense than the convoluted analysis undertaken by the
Third Circuit.
Practitioners and scholars alike have questioned the validi-
ty of the Third Circuit's approach. Lauren K. McNulty, a part-
ner in the Tax-Exempt Organizations Practice Group of
Gardner, Carton and Douglas, a Chicago law firm, commented
that "[t]he Third Circuit's opinion in effect shifts the focus of
the inquiry from whether the potential pool of subscribers is
broad enough to encompass the community to whether the
HMO benefits members of the community other than its sub-
scribers."98 Such an approach makes little sense when com-
pared to the approach taken in Sound Health.9 What portion
of the community needs to be served by the HMO to constitute
a community benefit? Presumably, if every member of the
community were a subscriber, the HMO could not be denied
exemption on the basis that it only serves its subscribers and
97. See Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 181 (1978) (defining
substantial community benefit).
98. Lauren K. McNulty, Recent Geisinger Opinions Address Community Benefit and In-
tegral Part Tests, 7 ExEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 933, 935 (1993) (discussing how the Geisinger
decisions set limitations on and made departures from prior analysis of the integral part theory).
99. See Sound Health, 71 T.C. at 158.
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not the community as a whole. A more realistic approach is to
recognize a benefit to the community if a particular
subscribership is essentially open to all members of the com-
munity.
While it is still unclear just how much weight each factor
is accorded under the Third Circuit approach, presumably, one
important factor is the direct provision of medical services.
Fred Gerhart, Counsel for GHP, responded to this position by
asking "[w]hy should it make any difference whether care is
provided by contract or employee? '' "° There seems to be no
basis for making such a distinction. Particularly in light of the
Third Circuit's position on the integral part doctrine, construc-
tion of the community benefit standard becomes increasingly
more important for healthcare organizations interested in re-
taining or acquiring exemption. The IRS and the courts need to
closely examine the path upon which they have embarked.
Thus, it seems that the community benefit standard, defined by
the Third Circuit, is a step in the wrong direction.
Given the Third Circuit's decision in Geisinger II and the
stated position of the IRS on the integral part issue, a separate-
ly incorporated healthcare organization must qualify for ex-
emption essentially on its own merits."' ° While empirically
untested, such a position may well have a chilling effect on the
development of alternative healthcare organizations. Many
organizations find it impractical, if not impossible, to operate
an HMO like GIP within preexisting exempt entities, and are
likewise, financially unable to operate a separately incorporat-
ed, but taxable, affiliate.
Given its novelty and confused foundation, it is unclear
whether the integral part test espoused by the Third Circuit is
here to stay. If the test is indeed to be widely applied, even
100. Paul Streckfus, IRS Wins Geisinger Case on Appeal, 7 EXEMPT ORG.TAX REV. 357,
358 (1993) (discussing the various reactions of practitioners to the Geisinger decisions). The
author also noted Gerhart's position that "no other areas of the tax law make this distinction that
the Service is making in the Geisinger case." Id.
101. See Laverne Woods & Peter N. Grant, The Third Circuit's Integral Part Test In
Geisinger Health Plan: Implications for lntegrated Delivery Systems, 10 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV.
1351, 1353 (1994) (asserting that "[i]n considering the qualifications of an IDS for tax exemption,
the IRS has consistently taken the position that the provider entity must meet the exemption
requirements, including satisfaction of the community benefit standard, on its own and without
reference to the activities of any exempt affiliate").
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more confusion will surround its application. Commentators
have expressed their dissatisfaction with the test and its appli-
cation in Geisinger I (3rd Cir.).1 2
There has been some debate among practitioners and
scholars as to how much, if at all, the new test has truly altered
the traditional integral part analysis. Fred Gerhart called the
test "a 'novel' approach. ' 1 3 On the other hand, Milt Cerny,
an attorney with Caplin and Drysdale, a Washington, D.C. law
firm, believes that the Third Circuit's test is consistent with
past rulings by the IRS. 1" Cerny also added that "the two-
pronged test does not add much to the analysis because it is
merely a new way of stating the same test."' 5 Cerny con-
strues the test as requiring that "the subsidiary's activities must
further the exempt purpose of the parent organization."' 6
However, the "boost" necessity set forth by the Third Circuit
seems to require just the opposite: that the parent organization
somehow "boost" the subsidiary such that the exempt purposes
of the parent are imputed to the subsidiary."° Douglas
Mancino of McDermott, Will, and Emery, a law firm in Los
Angeles, was of the opinion that the Third Circuit created an
entirely new and inconsistent test."
The end result and ultimate implication of the Third Cir-
cuit decision is that systems that want to operate HMOs are
faced with a serious dilemma. As a result of state laws and
regulations,"°9 it is not feasible for organizations to operate
such lMOs within the structure of preexisting care organiza-
tions. Yet, if they incorporate HMOs as separate entities, the
102. See, e.g., Hopkins, supra note 95, at 785 (discussing the confusion and inconsistency
associated with the Third Circuit opinion in Geisinger 11).
103. Marlis L. Carson, Geisinger Plan Fails Third Circuit's New 'Integral Part' Test, 10
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 273, 273 (1994) (quoting Fred Gerhart, of the law firm Dechert, Price




107. See Hopkins, supra note 95, at 785.
108. See Carson, supra note 103, at 273. The author summarized Mancino's views by
stating that "the Third Circuit has 'created an unworkable test.' The question should not be
whether the affiliation resulted in a greater segment of the population being served by the
healthcare system.., but rather whether the system's overall ability to serve the public is en-
hanced." Id.
109. See infra Section I & note 4.
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HMOs lose exemption unless they duplicate services already
provided by related entities. Even if the unprecedented ap-
proach of the Third Circuit is abandoned and the traditional
integral part doctrine readopted, under the Tax Court's analy-
sis, healthcare organizations will be left in the same
quandary."' There are no readily discernable public policy
reasons underlying such an approach.
11
'
B. The Historical Public Policy Approach to Healthcare
As a matter of public policy, healthcare organizations
historically have been exempt from federal income tax under
section 501(c)(3) of the IRC and its predecessors."' As previ-
ously discussed, hospitals were the dominant form of
healthcare delivery until the latter part of this century."' The
IRS, the courts, and scholars alike have recognized that in light
of the ever-changing political and economic environment, the
policy considerations underlying exemption for healthcare
organizations require a flexible definition of charitable medical
care.114
As the nature of healthcare continues to change, consider-
able debate has arisen regarding the policy rationales surround-
ing exempt healthcare organizations. In a 1991 article, Mark
Hall and John Colombo criticized the traditional theories un-
derlying exemption for healthcare organizations."' They ar-
gued that only those healthcare organizations funded primarily
110, See Geisinger, 100 T.C. at 394 (applying in part the traditional integral part test and
holding GHP not entitled to exemption).
111. See McNulty, supra note 98, at 935 (asserting that "[t]he Tax Court's approach seems
to unnecessarily narrow the integral part theory. There appears to be no compelling policy reason
to preclude an organization seeking exemption under the integral part theory from, in effect,
expanding the class of charitable beneficiaries served by the affiliated organizations").
112. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 14, at 317-18.
113. See Marmor, supra note 2.
114. See Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1287-88 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (modifying requirements set forth in Rev. Rul. 56-
185, 1956-1 C.B. 202); Douglas M. Mancino, Income Tax Exemption of the Contemporary
Nonprofit Hospital, 32 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 1015, 1019 (1988) (stating that "notions of what may be
'charitable' must develop and change with 'contemporary' society and its institutions"); Robert S.
Bromberg, Charity and Change: Current Problems of Tax Exempt Health and Welfare Organi-
zations in Perspective, in TAX PROBLEMS OF NON-PRoFrr ORGANIZATIONS 249 (1970).
115. See generally Hall & Colombo, supra note 14, at 307. The authors criticize the per se,
government burden, and community benefit theories of tax exemption and suggest a donative
theory as the appropriate standard for granting exemption.
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through philanthropic donations should be entitled to exemp-
tion under section 501(c)(3)." 6 Other scholars have taken a
much broader view of tax exemption. For example, Boris
Bittker and George Rahdert developed a theory based on the
premise that activities not undertaken for profit are inherently
untaxable.1 7 Finally, Rob Atkinson argued for an "altruism"
theory which would encompass a broader scope of nonprofit
organizations than does the current law.18
In addition to the theories underlying exemption in gener-
al, there may be some reasons to be concerned about exemp-
tion specifically in the healthcare arena. It often has been sug-
gested that due to the nature of healthcare, incentives for care
providers are most appropriately aligned with societal values in
a nonprofit framework." 9
While no theory of tax exemption in the healthcare arena
is flawless, the community benefit standard seems to be a
reasonable attempt at balancing the underlying policy consider-
ations. The obvious problem arises in defining community
benefit and identifying those healthcare organizations which
provide a requisite amount of it justifying exemption. If com-
munity benefit is to remain the standard under which
healthcare organizations are granted or denied exemption,
Congress, the IRS, and the courts must look carefully at the
construction of community benefit. The definition resulting
from the Geisinger litigation is unnecessarily restrictive and un-
warranted in light of legal precedent and public policy.
116. Id
117. See generally Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE LJ. 299 (1976) (arguing that the income
of nonprofit organizations does not fall under any traditional tax definition of income, and even if
it did, it would be impossible to calculate an appropriate tax rate).
118. See Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Special Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations,
in FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (1994) (arguing that essentially
any organization which provides secondary benefits to society, and whose income is not realized
in profits by its founders, should be entitled to exemption).
119. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 14, at 370-71 (acknowledging that some scholars have
argued that the nonprofit form is more attractive to patients because they place more trust in




In response to the rising costs of healthcare and the ever-
evolving body of medical technology, the function of care
providers and the methods of delivery have changed dramati-
cally. One dominant form of restructuring has centered around
the development of HMOs. Due to financial and operational
considerations, many HMOs have been organized as separate
entities. Such restructuring of traditional healthcare institutions
has led to a number of difficulties with respect to the tax treat-
ment of some of these organizations. In particular the construc-
tion and application of the community benefit and integral part
doctrines have led to much confusion in the nonprofit commu-
nity.
In Sound Health, the Tax Court held that a subscribership,
open to the public with little or no financial barriers to entry
provided a substantial community benefit warranting exemption
under section 501(c)(3). However, in Geisinger 1, the IRS and
the Third Circuit retreated from this position. While it is not
clear what basis the Court employed to make its decision, it is
clear that the Sound Health standard was effectively modified.
No longer is an open subscribership enough to get over the
community benefit hurdle. Whatever the current standard, one
thing seems clear: freestanding HMOs which themselves pro-
vide little or no direct medical services are no longer entitled
to exemption as public charities under section 501(c)(3). This
approach represents an unwarranted and unnecessary departure
from the traditional flexible standard of charitable care.
In addition to altering accepted notions of community
benefit, the Tax Court and the Third Circuit redefined the
integral part doctrine in Geisinger H1. The Tax Court held the
activities of GHP to be unrelated to the exempt purposes of the
other organizations in the System on the grounds that GHP
served only its subscribers, and not the patients of the other
entities. This is puzzling, to say the least, given that the ex-
press purpose of all the entities within the Geisinger System is
to promote healthcare in the community. The Third Circuit
then proceeded to change the test to encompass a previously
uncontemplated "boost" requirement. The "boost" requirement
1997]
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finds no basis in legal precedent or public policy, and undoubt-
edly has added confusion to the integral part analysis.
As we move into the twenty-first century, continued
change in the healthcare field seems evident. To accommodate
these changes, tax policy also must evolve to facilitate the
development of new forms of delivery. Only time will tell, but
the Geisinger decisions seem to be a step in the wrong direc-
tion. Not only have they served to restrict available options
regarding the structure of delivery systems, but both Geisinger
I and II have created much uncertainty for those attempting to
create new healthcare organizations. Congress and the IRS
would do well to carefully examine their current positions with
an eye toward clearing up the uncertainty which has resulted
from Geisinger.
